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In this paper, we introduce a framework designed to identify and rank possible unwarranted 
variation of treatments in healthcare. The innovative aspect of this framework is a ranking procedure 
that aims to identify healthcare institutions where unwarranted variation is most severe, and 
diagnosis treatment combinations which appear to be the most sensitive to unwarranted variation. 
By adding a ranking procedure to our framework, we have taken our research a step beyond the 
existing literature. This ranking procedure is intended to assist health insurance companies in their 
search for violations, and to help find them more quickly, enabling more effective corrective and 













1. Introduction  
Healthcare costs are continually rising, and one way to stop this trend is to reduce waste. 
Unwarranted variation is a type of waste that is difficult to prevent as in most cases choosing the 
optimal treatment for a patient leaves room for discretionary decision making. Variation in treating 
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patients is not surprising in itself, as each treatment has its own specific characteristics, such 
as the origin of the illness, the patient’s characteristics, medical evidence, or informed patient choice. 
All (possible) observed variation in treatment can initially be viewed as warranted variation.  In the 
literature, countless researchers have studied practice style variation in the footsteps of Wennberg 
and Gittelson (Wennberg and Gittelson, 1973), resulting in the well-known Dartmouth Atlas 
(Wennberg et al., 1982). In the systematic review of medical practice variation in OECD countries, 
after studying 836 papers, Corallo came to the conclusion that dramatic variations exist in all of these 
countries (Corallo et al., 2014). An estimation of the amount of waste created by unwarranted 
variation in hospital care equates to 250 to 300 billion dollar per year in the US (Kelly, 2009). 
Research has also shown that unwarranted variation is not only limited to hospital care, but is also 
found in general practice (Fertig et al., 1993; Jong de, 2008) and in mental healthcare (Ruiter de et 
al., 2013).  
 
One of the possible causes of unwarranted variation is the funding system for healthcare institutions 
and medical specialists, as it may induce undesirable financial incentives that affect the treatment 
administered to patients. Since the introduction of regulated market competition in the Netherlands, 
studies on this topic have become more relevant and more frequent (Hasaart et al., 2006; Jong de, 
2008; Pomp and Hasaart, 2009; Beek van, et al., 2010; Hasaart, 2011; Douven et al., 2012; 
Gunneweg, 2012; Healthcare insurers Netherlands 2014 A,). In an attempt to create a Dutch atlas for 
practice style variation, an initial attempt to calculate variations for a number of surgical 
interventions was performed by van Beek et al. (Beek van et al., 2010). This research showed large 
differences between both regions and hospitals with regard to surgery as a secondary option for 
specific diagnoses.  In fact, van Beek showed that reducing unwarranted variation in the Netherlands 
as much as possible based on a given reference value could result in a potential savings of 5% to 7% 
of the total macro budget of hospital care (900 million to 1.3 billion euro). 
 
The framework, which is data driven, consists of two steps. Firstly, a logistic regression model is 
drawn up and used to calculate the expected number of specific treatments for a set of patients in a 
given healthcare institution. Secondly, we rank these institutions based on three factors: a 
probability measure of the difference between the expected number and the realised number of 
treatments, the volume and the price. 
  
By adding a ranking procedure to our framework, we have taken our research a step beyond the 
existing literature. The previously mentioned research primarily focuses on proving the existence of 
variation and describing it. The innovative aspect of this framework is to rank both healthcare 
institutions and diagnosis treatment combinations with respect to the potential severity of their 
unwarranted variation.  This is an important addition, since it enables those in charge of preventing 
unwarranted variation to focus on those healthcare institutions and diagnosis treatment 
combinations where chances are most likely that the observed variation is indeed unwarranted and 
will have a big impact. In the Netherlands, this role is entrusted to healthcare insurers. Checking for 
unwarranted variation is very time consuming, because often the only effective solution is through 
clinical review. Given the fact that there are thousands of diagnosis treatment combinations which 
can be declared by hundreds of healthcare institutions, it may be clear that selection of to investigate 
diagnosis treatment combinations and healthcare institutions, is necessary. By using our ranking, 
healthcare insurers can more efficiently allocate their resources to target those healthcare 
institutions with the highest risk of adverse effects and false claims. Another advantage of the 
ranking is that it can be used to provide insight for other healthcare institutions into their behaviour 
and to create a preventive effect. 
  
In this paper, the framework is applied to both surgical interventions and in-patient admissions. 
Surgical interventions were chosen as much of the previous research on unwarranted variation has 
been based on these interventions (Wennberg and Gittelson, 1973; Beek van et al., 2010; Corallo et 
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al., 2014; Dafny, 2005; Hasaart, 2011; Healthcare insurers Netherlands, 2014B). Variation in in-patient 
admissions as an indicator for unwarranted variation is chosen less frequently, but was also referred 
to by Wennberg and Gittelson (Wennberg and Gittelson, 1973). Furthermore, research by the Dutch 
Healthcare Authority demonstrated that unwarranted in-patient admissions were registered to 
generate more revenue in two hospitals (NZa, 2011; NZa, 2014). Most input data required in this 
application of the framework is derived directly from a health insurance company’s database5. For 
specific variables, such as socio-economic status, we have added external data sources. 
 
The rankings, based on the framework, indicate the possible presence of unwarranted variation in 23 
out of 136 hospitals (17%). Further detailed research on a specific diagnosis has already shown that 
unwarranted variation is present for one highly ranked hospital. Furthermore, 43% of the diagnosis 
treatment combinations seem more or less vulnerable to this type of variation. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the relevant 
technicalities of funding specialist medical care in the Netherlands. The framework describing the 
ranking procedure is presented in Section 3. An elaborate case study is discussed in Section 4. In 




2. Funding of specialist medical care in the Netherlands 
In this section, we provide a short overview of the changes to funding for healthcare institutions and 
medical specialists in the Netherlands over the last two decades. It shows that, in spite of these 
various changes, incentives for unwarranted variation are still present. 
 
Until 2005 in the Netherlands, the funding of healthcare institutions dealing in specialist medical care 
was based on a system of fixed budgets. Since 2005, in addition to the budget system, funding of 
healthcare institutions has been partially based on a case mix system. In this case mix system, a 
distinction is made between segment A and segment B. In segment A, prices are set nationwide and 
are the same for all healthcare institutions. In segment B, the price is set through an agreement 
between individual healthcare insurers and individual healthcare institutions. There is no limit 
regarding the maximum amount to be declared within this segment. In 2012, segment B, was 
expanded considerably.  We can conclude that the funding of healthcare institutions since 2012 - 
aside from the fixed segment – is nearly entirely based on actual production (Canoy et al., 2011). 
 
The remuneration system for medical specialists has not evolved in parallel with the funding of 
healthcare institutions. From 1988 until 1995, medical specialists in the Netherlands worked with a 
remuneration system based on a fee-for–service model. In 1995, a lump sum system was introduced, 
where prospective annual budgets per specialty per healthcare institution were established, followed 
by a case mix system in 2008. In 2012, lump sum financing was reintroduced.  From 2015 onwards, 
the remuneration of medical specialists was brought back into line with those of healthcare 
institutions, and is now based on a case mix system.  Figure 1 summarises the funding systems for 
both healthcare institutions and medical specialists. 
 
                                                          




Figure 1: Funding systems for healthcare institutions and medical specialists in the Netherlands 
The different funding systems described above all induce their own incentives. Budget financing 
provides the incentive to minimise the volume of care, while case mix funding provides the incentive 
to maximise the volume of care (Hasaart, 2011). This incentive structure is graphically displayed in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Incentive structure in different funding systems 
Figure 1 shows that in a substantial part of the period described, there are conflicting incentives 
when it comes to funding medical specialists and healthcare institutions. Only in the period from 
1995 to 2005 were there converging incentives, as can been seen in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: A comparison of incentives in the funding system for healthcare institutions and medical specialists in the 
Netherlands 
This historical overview shows that incentives relating to the prevailing funding systems can change 
relatively quickly.  
 
In the case of incentives aimed towards minimising the volume of care, there may be skimming 
(under-provision of services) or dumping (explicit avoidance of high severity patients), as described 
by Randall (Randall, 1998). In the case of incentives aimed towards maximisation of care, creaming 
(over-provision of services) can be observed. Many forms of creaming are explored and described by 
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Dafny, Douven et al. and Shigeoka and Fushimi (Dafny, 2005; Douven et al., 2015; Shigeoka and 
Fushimi, 2014). Situations of opposing stimuli between medical specialists and healthcare institutions 
have not led to the disappearance of unwarranted variation, as exemplified by Hasaart (Hasaart, 
2011). 
 
As it would appear, so far all concerned parties have failed to introduce a funding system in the 
Netherlands without adverse incentives. Literature shows that the Netherlands is not unique in this 
(Zhu, 2004; Santiani, 2012; Bystrov, 2015). The situation described above also demonstrates that, as 
a reaction to the negative effects of one funding system, a new funding system is often introduced to 
eliminate these negative effects, while unintentionally creating new opposite effects. The 
Netherlands is no exception (Hajizadeh et al., 2014; Göpffarth and Henke, 2013). In developing the 
framework, we have focused on identifying over-provision, since the current funding system applied 
in the Netherlands has driven little incentive for under-provision.   
 
3. Framework 
In this section, we introduce a framework designed to rank both healthcare institutions and diagnosis 
treatment combinations with respect to the potential severity of their unwarranted variation . 
Despite the fact that we only describe the framework for dependent variables with a dichotomous 
character, we emphasize that the framework is not limited to these types of variables. This 
framework is data driven, and the main source of data used in the framework is patient level data. 
This kind of data is available from healthcare insurers. Other sources are also used, notably public 
data relating to patient level information that is not available from healthcare institutions or general 
tables that can classify patient level information. 
The framework consists of two steps that run sequentially. In the first step, a logistic regression 
model is drawn up to predict the probability that treatment is administered for a patient bearing 
certain characteristics. The second step provides a ranking of either healthcare institutions or 
Diagnosis Treatment Combinations (DTCs). These rankings are calculated using a probability measure 
for the difference between the expected number of treatments for a healthcare institution, as 
predicted by the logistic regression model, and the observed number of treatments. The score, on 
which the ranking is based, is obtained from this probability in association with a volume factor and a 
price factor corresponding to the healthcare institution and DTC. In the remaining part of this 
section, each step of the framework is discussed in detail. 
Step 1: Logistic regression model 
In the first step, a logistic regression model is estimated to predict the outcome of a dichotomous 
variable at patient level. In our analysis, we take into account a combination of a diagnoses and 
particular treatments that may or may not have been established. Note that the same diagnosis can 
be examined in combination with several treatments. The set of explanatory variables in the logistic 
regression model, X1 to Xk, aims to correct for patient complexity and is in line with performed 
research on unwarranted variation using logistic regression models (Wennberg, 2010; Hasaart, 2011; 
Healthcare insurers Nederland, 2014).  
 
For any given patient, we aim to predict the probability 𝑝𝑝 of a particular treatment; hence, the 
logistic model can be formulated as: log � 𝑝𝑝
1−𝑝𝑝
� =  𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋2 + ⋯+   𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘. It is important to 
note that our model does not aim to predict this probability with the highest possible accuracy. To 
predict the probability with the highest possible accuracy it would be necessary to include not only 
the factors justifying the variation, but also the factors that lead to unjustified variation such as for 
example the characteristics of doctor delivering the care. Given the objective of the framework these 




Once the coefficients of the logistic regression model are estimated, the probability of a treatment 
can be computed for any patient with given characteristics and a specific diagnosis. By considering all 
patients having attended a specific healthcare institution with a specific diagnosis, the expected 
number of treatments for this healthcare provider can simply be computed by summation of all 
patient probabilities. Moreover, these probabilities can also be used to derive the probability 
distribution of the number of treatments for patients treated by a given healthcare institution. 
 
Step 2: The Ranking Procedure 
In this step, we describe the ranking procedure that health insurance companies can use to draw 
attention to DTCs and healthcare providers where further analysis may be necessary regarding 
unwarranted variation. This ranking is derived from scores calculated for each combination of DTCs 
and healthcare provider. The score measures the desirability for further analysis based upon three 
aspects: the probability of the presence of unwarranted variation, the number of treatments 
involved, and the cost difference dependent on whether or not treatment is administered. 
 
Consider a specific combination of a DTC and healthcare provider. Let 𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) denote the observed 
number of treatments for DTC 𝑑𝑑 and healthcare provider ℎ. Taking into account the exact same set 
of patients and all their known characteristics, we can calculate the expected number of treatments 
𝐸𝐸(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) using the logistic regression model from step 1. The difference between the observed and 
expected number of treatments could be interpreted as an indication of the number of unwarranted 
treatments. Hence, if the difference is large, it is more appealing for the healthcare insurer to check 
the corresponding declarations. 
 
A larger difference between the observed and expected number of treatments could be less 
significant if the difference is relatively small compared to the total number of treatments. Similarly, 
a small difference may be more significant if the number of treatments also is small, as shown in 
Table 1. This table presents two institutions. Institution 1 with a total number of 15,000 DTCs and 
institution 2 whit a total number of 100 DTCs. Although the difference between the realised and 
expected number of surgeries of institution 2 is 5 times smaller than that of institution 1, the 
difference of institution 2 is more significant, as shown in the last column of Table 1.  
 
Table 1 : Illustration of difference in significance.   
In general, this can be quantified by comparing 𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) with the number of treatments, denoted by 
𝑋𝑋(𝑑𝑑, ℎ), for a hypothetical healthcare provider with the exact same set of patients. Using the results 
from the logistic regression, we can calculate the probability6 that the hypothetical healthcare 
provider uses the same amount of treatments or less: Pr�𝑋𝑋(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) ≤ 𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑,ℎ)�. We could interpret this 
as the probability that a hypothetical healthcare provider can improve the target set by the observed 
number of treatments 𝑅𝑅(ℎ,𝑑𝑑). If this probability is small, then the observed number of treatments 
𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) for healthcare provider ℎ cannot obviously or easily be improved, hence, unwarranted 
variation by healthcare provider ℎ is unlikely. On the other hand, if the probability is large, then it is 
easy to improve the observed number of treatments 𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) for this set of patients, and 
                                                          
6 Formally, 𝑋𝑋(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) has a binomial distribution 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(𝐵𝐵,𝑝𝑝) where 𝐵𝐵 is the total number of 
treatments of diagnosis d at healthcare provider h and 𝑝𝑝 the (average) probability for 
expensive treatments regarding the set of patients i.e., 𝑝𝑝 = E(d,h)
n
. It should be noted that 
this probability is unreliable when the expected number of either the basic or the expensive 



















1 15,000 12,800 0.85 12,750 50 0.88
2 100 95 0.85 85 10 1.00
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unwarranted variation by ℎ is more likely, making it more attractive for the healthcare insurer to 
perform further investigations.  
We can now provide the score formula integrating the abovementioned factors. The score for DTC 𝑑𝑑 
and healthcare provider ℎ is the product of three factors:  
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) = �𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑑𝑑,ℎ)� × Pr�𝑋𝑋(𝑑𝑑, ℎ) ≤ 𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑,ℎ)� × �𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦(𝑑𝑑, ℎ)− 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑑𝑑,ℎ)� 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦(𝑑𝑑, ℎ) and 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) are the costs of administering the treatment or not for DTC 𝑑𝑑 and 
healthcare institution ℎ, respectively. For each of these factors, and hence also for the score, a higher 
value makes it more attractive for the healthcare insurer to perform further investigations. The first 
two factors are the difference in observed and expected number of treatments and the relative 
significance of this difference. The last factor indicates the financial difference dependent on 
whether or not the treatment is administered. Note that the score becomes negative when the 
observed number of treatments is smaller than expected. In this case, over-provision is unlikely. 
However, a positive score does not necessarily imply unwarranted variation. Nevertheless, positive 
outliers yield interesting objects for further inspection.  
 
In addition to picking individual combinations of DTCs and healthcare providers, we are also 
interested in identifying DTCs that might be susceptible to unwarranted variation or healthcare 
providers likely to show unwarranted variation for multiple DTCs. Simple aggregation of scores is 
undesirable, however, as negative and low scores can obscure the outliers. Therefore, adjusted 
scores are calculated where all scores below a certain threshold 𝐿𝐿 will be set as equal to zero: 
𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) = �𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑑𝑑,ℎ) > 𝐿𝐿,0 otherwise.
 
Thereafter, all adjusted scores concerning a particular DTC or healthcare institution are added 
together to the DTC score and the provider score, respectively: 




𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(ℎ) = � 𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑑𝑑,ℎ).
𝑑𝑑
 
To achieve the ranking of DTCs or healthcare institutions, the DTCScores and ProviderScores are then 
ranked from high to low. 
4. Case study 
In this section, the framework will be applied to a number of diagnoses concerning the specialty 
surgery. Firstly, the source of the dataset and some of its general characteristics are described. The 
diagnoses selected for the case study are discussed, and a description of the dependent and 
explanatory variables is subsequently given. Secondly, the framework will be demonstrated with 
reference to an exemplary calculation relating to one diagnosis. Finally, the results obtained by 
applying the framework to the selected data are discussed. 
 
We begin to describe some of the data set’s general characteristics. The data used for this study 
stems from two different databases. Most variables are obtained from the database of a large health 
insurance company in the Netherlands. This database contains patient related data and healthcare 
institution declarations from the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. The second database is provided by the 
Dutch Socio-Economic Planning Agency, and is used solely to add a proxy for Socio-Economic Status 
(SES) based on patients’ post codes.  A reference table provided by the Dutch Ministry of Health is 
used to calculate the variable Diagnosis Cost Group (DCG) per patient, by comparing the diagnosis 
listed in the reference table with the diagnoses declared for that patient in previous years.  
 
We have chosen diagnoses concerning the specialty surgery as previous research (e.g. Vektis 
(Healthcare insurers Netherlands, 2014A) has been conducted on unwarranted variation within this 
specialty using the methodology provided by the Dartmouth Atlas project (Dartmouth, 2015). These 
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studies revealed that some specialty’s, including the chosen specialty surgery, appear to be prone to 
unwarranted variation. Within our given specialty surgery, the 12 diagnoses shown in Table 2 were 
selected based on their variation and the number of claims. In addition to a number of diagnoses 
whereby, based on the results of earlier research, high variation is expected, also a number of 
diagnoses are included whereby variation is less obvious. The number and the percentage of claims 
for these diagnoses are also shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Selected diagnoses 
Before describing the dependent and explanatory variables, it is important to note that the 
Netherlands has its own case mix system to bill healthcare institution claims. An important difference 
with other case mix systems is the possibility for multiple billable products for the same diagnosis. 
For our analysis, it is therefore crucial to take into account the entirety of the care pathway that can 
consist of multiple products. By doing this, we ensure that every patient is included only once per 
diagnosis. For example, if a patient with a particular diagnosis has been through in-patient 
admissions, and has undergone surgery, then a unique care pathway must be taken into account for 
this whole diagnosis, linked only to the surgery. As a consequence, the 218,994 claims involved in 
this study are part of 184,678 individual care pathway. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the framework is applied to two dependent variables: surgical 
intervention and in-patient admissions. The 12 diagnoses in combination with the two dependent 
variables, surgery and in-patient admission, lead to 23 DTCs, since no surgical interventions are 
declared for diagnosis 294. This is due to specific regulations applicable to this diagnosis. For each 
diagnosis, except diagnosis 294, we therefore have two DTCs concerning, one for surgical 
intervention (s) and one for in-patient admission (i). The numbers and percentages pertaining to 
surgical interventions and in-patient admissions per diagnosis are shown in Table 3, indicating that 
diagnosis 602 has the highest percentage of in-patient admissions (91.7%), which is referred to as 
602i. Diagnosis 170 has the highest percentage of surgical interventions (78.9%), which is referred to 
as 170s.  
 
Table 3: Number and percentage of surgeries and in-patient admissions  
Diagnoses Number Percentage
117 Haemorrhoids 29,626 13.5
121 Hernia femoralis/inguinalis 26,919 12.3
129 Other general abdominal discomfort 36,571 16.7
170 Ganglion, large lipoma, unguis incarn 33,012 15.1
179 Other general diagnoses 18,658 8.5
218 Femur fracture (proximal + collum) 9,397 4.3
294 Unspecified trauma screening 8,409 3.8
323 Cholecystitis/Cholelithiasis 22,459 10.3
329 Other non-malignant gastrointestinal disorders 16,234 7.4
341 Morbid obesity BMI <45 7,626 3.5
342 Morbid obesity >45 8,201 3.7
602 Multi-trauma ISS>= 16 1,882 0.9
Total 218,994 100.0
DTC Yes No Total Percentage DTC Yes No Total Percentage
117i 206 20,156 20,362 1.0 117s 4,908 15,454 20,362 24.1
121i 17,138 5,559 22,697 75.5 121s 17,428 5,269 22,697 76.8
129i 4,362 30,138 34,500 12.6 129s 813 33,687 34,500 2.4
170i 111 29,233 29,344 0.4 170s 23,151 6,193 29,344 78.9
179i 503 17,373 17,876 2.8 179s 763 17,113 17,876 4.3
218i 5,588 2,018 7,606 73.5 218s 5,268 2,338 7,606 69.3
294i 2,554 5,820 8,374 30.5 0 8,374 8,374 0.0
323i 15,579 3,715 19,294 80.7 323s 14,761 4,533 19,294 76.5
329i 3,522 10,025 13,547 26.0 329s 2,453 11,094 13,547 18.1
341i 1,935 2,340 4,275 45.3 341s 1,886 2,389 4,275 44.1
342i 2,845 2,245 5,090 55.9 342s 2,943 2,147 5,090 57.8
602i 1,571 142 1,713 91.7 602s 494 1,219 1,713 28.8




The chosen treatment with respect to a diagnosis will be explained using a set of explanatory 
variables. Based on a particular diagnosis, different variables will have an influence on the treatment 
chosen. This involves patient-related variables. In the Netherlands, in the context of risk equalisation 
and commissioned by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, research has been ongoing to study 
these variables (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 2007; Kleef van et al., 2014). Variables in the 
spotlight and also used in this study are sex, age, SES and DCG. All of these variables are known for 
their impact on health care costs. However, whether they have an impact on the treatment selected 
for a particular diagnosis is uncertain and must therefore be determined using logistic regression. 
Below, the variables are discussed in more detail. 
 
Sex 
Sex is the only variable which can be included in the regression model directly from the data set. As 
observed in Table 4, the majority of claims (52.14%) relate to female patients. In 0.16% of the 
submitted claims, the sex of the patient is unknown. 
 
Table 4: Sex factor for the submitted claims 
 Age 
The age variable is calculated by subtracting the date of birth from the start date of the care 
pathway. In Figure 4, we observe an example of the relationship between age and the percentage of 
patients undergoing surgery and patients who were admitted to the clinic.  
 
Figure 4: Relation between age and the rate of in-patient admissions or surgical procedures 
Based on this information, it is clear that there is no straightforward relationship between age and 
the percentage of patients undergoing surgery or patients who were admitted to the clinic for 
diagnosis 329. In all examined diagnoses, we see a similar pattern between age and the dependent 
variables. Due to the absence of an obvious relationship, age is placed in 11 classes of 10 years of age 
and added as a dummy variable to the logistic regression model. 
 
SES 
The Socio-Economic Status (SES) variable reflects the level of income and education of the patients, 
among other things. Thanks to other studies (Hollander de et al., 2006; Kunst et al., 2007), it is well 
established that there is a relationship between SES and health conditions. The SES score is 
determined by matching the first four digits of the patient’s post code with a table published by the 
Dutch National Healthcare Institute. Based on this match, the patient is assigned a SES which can 
range from 1 to 10. The difference between these classes is based inter alia on the clustering of a 
number of socio-economic, demographic and health-related characteristics. Research has shown that 








Sport, 2007). As shown in Table 5, in 0.5% of claims (916), the patient’s post code is not included in 
the data file, meaning that the SES cannot be determined. The distribution of the SES for the 
remaining 99.5% of the claims is shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Distribution of Socio-Economic Status 
In general, it is assumed that an individual’s healthcare costs decrease as the SES increases. Because 
the relationship between the development of healthcare costs and the SES has only been 
demonstrated for total costs, and as no straightforward relationship appears to exist between SES 
and the costs at a diagnosis level, the choice is made to add the 10 different SES scores as dummy 
variables to the logistic regression model. 
 
DCG 
DCGs have been developed to identify insured persons undergoing treatment for a chronic condition 
(Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 2007) and are therefore expected to generate higher annual 
costs. DCGs consist of a clustering of diagnoses that are homogeneous in composition as regards to 
expected extra costs. Clustering has been carried out based on cost characteristics and is not based 
on medically substantive arguments. The DCG is derived using the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport issued conversion table (Care institute Netherlands, 2014). This conversion table is split into 16 
different DCG levels (from 0 to 15) that are taken into account in the regression model using 15 
dummy variables. DCG 0, which indicates that the patient is not undergoing treatment for a chronic 
condition, is not included in the model. Table 6 shows that in 78,1% of claims (144,296), patients are 
not undergoing treatment for a chronic condition, indicated by the score one at DCG0.  In case of 
40,382 claims, patients receive at least treatment for one chronical condition, which is expressed in 
at least one of the scores from DCG1 to DCG15 and no score at DCG0. With the exception of DCG 0, it 
is possible for a patient to have a value equal to one for more than one DCG level, due to co-
morbidity. This explains why 62,163 DCGs are registered in 40,382 claims, as shown in Table 6.  
  
Table 6: distribution Diagnosis Cost Group. 
DCGs are thus included in the investigation as a dummy variable, as they provide more information 















DCG Yes No Total Percentage
0 144,296 40,382 184,678 78.1
1 3,447 181,231 184,678 1.9
2 9,267 175,411 184,678 5.0
3 7,539 177,139 184,678 4.1
4 12,461 172,217 184,678 6.7
5 8,699 175,979 184,678 4.7
6 8,325 176,353 184,678 4.5
7 4,239 180,439 184,678 2.3
8 1,211 183,467 184,678 0.7
9 2,165 182,513 184,678 1.2
10 2,441 182,237 184,678 1.3
11 408 184,270 184,678 0.2
12 778 183,900 184,678 0.4
13 760 183,918 184,678 0.4
14 365 184,313 184,678 0.2
15 58 184,620 184,678 0.0




In the logistic regression model concerning ‘in-patient admission’, the fact that surgery was used or 
not is added to the model as an explanatory variable, as surgery often causes an in-patient admission 
and in the case of the ‘in-patient admission’ variation, we are only interested in the variation not 
caused by surgical intervention.     
 
In the following part, we discuss the construction of the logistic regression models per diagnosis. 
Then, based on a single DTC (602S) and with respect to the framework, the various steps of said 
framework are demonstrated.  
 
First, we will discuss the logistic regression model. For a given diagnosis where we aim to estimate 
whether a patient will undergo an operation or not, the logistic model will be:  
log � 𝑝𝑝
1−𝑝𝑝
� =  𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆 +  𝛽𝛽2−11 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠2−11 +   𝛽𝛽12−27 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−15 +  𝛽𝛽28−37 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴28−37    
where 𝑝𝑝 is the probability that a patient will undergo surgery or be admitted as an in-patient. 
Straightforward mathematical manipulations show that 𝑝𝑝 equals: 
 
𝑝𝑝 = 𝑦𝑦
(𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1∗𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆+ 𝛽𝛽2−11∗𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆2−11+  𝛽𝛽12−27∗𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷12−27 +  𝛽𝛽28−37∗𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆28−37)
1+ 𝑦𝑦(𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1∗𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆+ 𝛽𝛽2−11∗𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆2−11+  𝛽𝛽12−27∗𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷12−27 +  𝛽𝛽28−37∗𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆28−37)
. 
 
The logistic model for a given diagnosis where we aim to estimate whether or not a patient will be 
admitted to a healthcare institution is based on the same model with the addition of the explanatory 
variable "Surgery". 
 
The regression model is constructed in the same way for all DTCs. For each DTC, the explanatory 
power of the independent variables is determined using the Backward-Wald methodology.  
The following example illustrates the logistic regression model for DTC 602s. The dichotomous 
dependent variable in this situation is ‘Surgery’, i.e. the patient undergoes Surgery (value 1) or the 
patient does not undergo Surgery (value 0). Using the data from all insured patients registered as 
suffering from diagnosis 602, by means of the stepwise Backward-Wald, the logistic model is 
calculated, as shown in Table 7. 
 
* Significance of 0.05 for entry of the variable and 0.1 for removal 
Table 7: Illustration of the logistic regression model concerning DTC 602s 
This table shows that all explanatory variables included in the model have a negative effect on the 
chance of undergoing surgery (B <0), with exception of variable SES6, which has a positive score of 
0.408. Based on this model, the probability of an insured patient undergoing surgery can be 







A patient with DCG3=1, DCG4=0, DCG5=1, SES1=1 and SES6=0 has a probability of 0.051 of 
undergoing surgery, whereas an insured patient with DCG3=0, DCG4=0, DCG5=0, SES1=0 and SES6=1 
has a probability of 0.398. Using logistic regression models constructed per DTC, we can determine 
the expected number of in-patient admissions and surgical interventions per healthcare institution. 
The realised and expected numbers of surgeries per healthcare institution, concerning diagnosis 602s 
B S.E. Sig.
DCG3(1) -0.886 0.387 0.022
DCG4(1) -0.572 0.276 0.038
DCG5(1) -0.84 0.32 0.009
SES1(1) -0.371 0.194 0.055
SES6(1) 0.408 0.177 0.021
Constant -0.82 0.062 0
Variables in the equation
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are displayed in Figure 5. Based on this, we can conclude that the first healthcare institution (851), 
with a total of 296 observations, performed 115 surgeries more than expected, and institution 685, 
with a total of 231 observations, performed 33 surgeries less than expected.  
  
 Figure 5: Realised and expected number of surgeries per healthcare institution, concerning DTC 602s 
 
Hereafter, the difference between the actual number of operations or in-patient admissions and the 
expected number can be determined, after which the score can be calculated. An example of this, 
based on DTC 602s regarding healthcare institutions 851 and 911, is given in Table 8. This shows the 
values of the formula’s different components, which, multiplied by each other, result in the two 
displayed scores (1,044.16 at healthcare institution 851, and 43.14 at healthcare institution 911).  
 
Table 8: Example calculation of the AdjustedScore concerning DTC 602s 
The final step is the calculation of the AdjustedScore per DTC per healthcare institution. This takes 
into account a threshold value (L) in order to prevent negative and low scores from obscuring the 
outliers. In this study, a threshold value (172.2) is used, corresponding to twice the standard 
deviation based on all scores. Considering this threshold, the two adjusted scores can be calculated 
(AdjustedScore (602s,851)=1,044.16 and AdjustedScore (602s,911)=0).  
 
After calculating the adjusted score per DTC per healthcare institution, the ProviderScore and the 
DTCScore can be calculated. The results are presented below. First the ProviderScores are discussed, 
followed by the DTCScores. 
 
The different healthcare institutions and DTCs are classified into two categories: Low Risk when the 
AdjustedScore equals zero, and High Risk when there is at least one positive AdjustedScore. The 
ProviderScores are shown in Figure 6. In the healthcare institution with the highest ranking at 
position one, the highest level of unwarranted variation is expected. It should be noted that in 23 out 
of a total of 136 healthcare institutions (17%), there is a positive ProviderScore, therefore classifying 
them as High Risk and including them in the figures. 
851 911
Number of observations 296 79
Number surgeries realised R(d,h) 201 29
Number surgeris expected E(d,h) 86.25 23.82
Probability Pr(X(d,h)≤R(d,h)) 1.00 0.92
Price diff surgery Phigh(d,h)-Plow(d,h) 9.10 9.10






Figure 6: Ranking of Healthcare institutions  
Figure 6 shows that the position of healthcare institution 975 at position number one in the ranking 
is based on a ProviderScore of 1,478.22 points. This ProviderScore is the result of only one positive 
AdjustedScore. Healthcare institution 116, with the lowest position in the ranking (23rd position) 
owes its position to a ProviderScore of 183.72, also based on one positive AdjustedScore. Healthcare 
institutions in places 1 to 14 are responsible for nearly 80% of the total ProviderScores. For the 
healthcare institutions included in the ranking, in 16 of the 23 cases, the ProviderScore is based on 




Figure 7: Ranking of DTCs 
Figure 7 shows the DTCScores. The DTC with the highest ranking is probably the most vulnerable to 
unwarranted variation. Based on these figures, we see that DTC 342s with the highest ranking has a 
DTCScore of 3,002.58 points. Five healthcare institutions have contributed to the realisation of this 
DTCScore. What also becomes clear is that 13 DTCs (57%) do not seem to be sensitive to 
unwarranted variation (117i, 121i, 121s, 170i, 170s, 179i, 179s, 218i, 294i, 323i, 323s, 342i and 602i), 
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as their DTCScores are equal to zero. These DTCs are classified as “Low Risk”.  It is also clear that six 
DTCs are responsible for more than 80% of the total DTCScores. 
 
Below, the DTCscores are discussed in more detail. First we will discuss DTCs 341s, 341i and 342s, 
which are collectively responsible for nearly 40% of the total DTCScore and all concern the “morbid 
obesity” diagnosis. We will then discuss DTC 602s, one of the top six DTCs with a relatively high 
DTCScore observed at a single healthcare institution. Then we look at the DTCScores of DTCs 129i, 
129s, 329i and 329s, all four of which belong to diagnoses that are harder to define due to their 
related symptoms. The section concludes with an analysis of two DTCs (218s and 117s) for which 
further investigation has already been carried out. 
   
Two DTCs which certainly qualify for further research are DTC 341s and 342s. Both DTCs relate to 
“morbid obesity” diagnoses. The number of healthcare institutions in which treatments concerning 
this diagnosis are carried out is limited (31). Seven healthcare institutions have a positive DTCScore 
on one or two DTCs within this group, as shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: DTCScores for morbid obesity diagnoses 
More than 90% of the total DTCScores in this group are related to surgical treatments (341s and 
342s). Within these two DTCs, there is considerable variation between the institutions in terms of 
their contribution to the DTCScore. What is also striking is the relatively high ProviderScore of 
healthcare institution 953 for DTC 341i. Nearly 40% of the total DTCScore (5,193.16 points) is caused 
by the three DTCs relating to morbid obesity diagnoses. This means that with a relatively small effort, 
by further research in these seven healthcare institutions, we can obtain knowledge about what is 
causing a significant proportion of the observed unwarranted variation.   
 
In the case of DTC 602s, there is a situation where the DTCScore is influenced by the contribution of 
one healthcare institution (851). Table 10 shows that besides healthcare institution 851 - which 
clearly declares more than expected (114.75) - healthcare institution 685, also with a large number of 
declarations, clearly claims less than expected (-36.4). Given this finding and the high DTCScore of 
DTC 602s, further analysis is also indicated here, all the more because the observed variation is 
unexpected given the type of diagnosis. 
 
Table 10: Part of ProviderScores(602s) 
When the DTCs associated with the diagnosis codes 329 "Other non-malignant gastrointestinal 
disorders", and diagnosis code 129 "Other general abdominal discomfort", are analysed in more 
detail, it becomes clear that there is a less stringent definition of these diagnoses. This is related to 
the Dutch classification system for diagnoses, used for the specialty surgery. This classification 
system makes it possible for medical complaints that cannot be unambiguously classified to be 
placed in the category “Other complaints concerning…”. It is impossible to exclude the potential risk 
of one surgeon assigning medical complaints to this group, while another surgeon assigns the same 
341i 341s 342i 342s Total
975 1,478.22 1,478.22
706 844.11 286.43 1,130.54
621 677.00 677.00
980 630.51 630.51
953 393.49 174.48 567.97
1002 386.45 386.45
445 322.47 322.47













Number of observations 296 231
Number surgeries realised R(d,h) 201 34
Number surgeris expected E(d,h) 86.25 66.94
Probability Pr(X(d,h)≤R(d,h)) 1.00 0.00
Price diff surgery Phigh(d,h)-Plow(d,h) 9.10 9.10





pattern of medical complaints to a specific diagnosis. Variations in diagnosing may be measured 
instead of variations in treatment for the same symptoms. It remains possible that this could be 
financially motivated, and must therefore not be ruled out in advance for research on unwarranted 
variation.  
 
Table 11: Diagnoses score Diagnosis 129 and 329.    
Table 11 shows the various healthcare institutions’ contributions to the DTCScores. It is evident that 
the DTCScores for 329s are explained by a higher rate at a larger number of institutions than for DTCs 
129i, 129s and 329i. It is also important to note the strikingly high DTCScore of healthcare institution 
718 for DTC 329i. 
 
Finally, we discuss two DTCs (218s and 117s) for which further investigation has already been carried 
out. As shown in Table 12, the DTCScore of DTC 218s (2,188.45 points) is drawn from seven different 
healthcare institutions, where the contribution per institution differs considerably. We could 
therefore conclude that this diagnosis which ranks in at fourth place is sensitive to unwarranted 
variation. This is extraordinary, as quite the opposite is expected, thanks to the clear guideline 
applied to this diagnosis (Vugt van, 2007). The degree of variation between healthcare institutions 
makes this situation even more special, given that this guideline leaves little room for different 
interpretations.  
 
Table 12: DTCscores for DTCs 117s and 218s    
Further substantive assessment indicates that this variation is caused by differences in practice 
between the healthcare institutions. In all cases, diagnosis 218 (femur fracture, proximal (+ collum)) 
is diagnosed by the surgeon. Treatment, however, may either be performed by a surgeon or by an 
orthopaedic surgeon, and this varies per healthcare institution. Because our analysis only takes 
treatments carried out by surgeons into account, there seems to be a difference in the percentage of 
operations performed. In reality, the difference is centred on whether or not the patient was 
referred to an orthopaedic surgeon before treatment. If the logistic model is adjusted by adding this 
variable of whether or not the patient is treated by an orthopaedic surgeon, a great deal of the 
observed variation can be eliminated.  
 
In the case of DTC 117s, a follow-up study has been implemented in the only healthcare institution 
(728) with a positive DTCScore (419.15). This follow-up study showed that this DTCScore was caused 
by upcoding as this health care institution registered all treatments as a surgical procedure, even if 
129i 129s 329i 329s Total
718 0.00 0.00 885.79 0.00 885.79
750 0.00 295.06 0.00 254.53 549.59
786 0.00 0.00 0.00 523.72 523.72
677 0.00 0.00 481.82 0.00 481.82
580 368.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 368.97
696 358.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 358.74
978 0.00 0.00 0.00 354.35 354.35
851 0.00 0.00 0.00 301.09 301.09
807 0.00 0.00 0.00 265.05 265.05
644 0.00 203.64 0.00 0.00 203.64
611 200.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 200.24



































the procedure carried out was not in an operative setting. Based on price difference and volume, the 
financial impact is estimated at approximately €400,000. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This section briefly discusses the way in which the framework is developed and the choices that have 
been made, followed by a brief summary of the case study’s results and the conclusions that can be 
drawn. This section concludes with some recommendations for future research, including wider use 
of the framework. 
 
Through our research, we have created a framework designed to rank healthcare institutions based 
on their level of unwarranted variation. The underlying rationale behind our research is that in order 
to control rising healthcare costs, it is important to detect adverse effects such as over-provision of 
certain services. In the Netherlands, healthcare insurers have been entrusted to act as a 
countervailing power against effects like unwarranted variation. Our framework will help them 
execute this task by more efficiently directing their resources. 
 
This framework consists of a logistic regression model used to estimate the outcome of the 
dependent variable and establish a ranking for healthcare institutions or DTCs. The explanatory 
power of the independent variables for all DTCs is established using the Backward-Wald method. For 
control purposes, the Forward-Wald and the Forward- and Backward Log Likelihood methods were 
also applied. The logistic regression models constructed using these methods had little or no effect 
on the outcome when calculating the expected number of operations or in-patient admissions, and 
thus hardly affect the final ranking. In fact, the partition High and Low Risk healthcare providers and 
DTCs remain unchanged. The ranking is derived from scores calculated for each combination of DTC 
and healthcare provider. These rankings are calculated using the probability that measures the 
likelihood of unwarranted variation. This probability is multiplied by the difference between the 
expected and the realised number of treatments, and the price difference between the application 
and non-application of these treatments. In the healthcare institution with the highest position in the 
ranking, the risk of unwarranted variation is the greatest. The DTC with the highest position in the 
ranking is the most prone to this kind of variation.  
 
In our case study, we applied this framework to 23 DTCs concerning the specialty surgery. 
The results show that, in the context of the ranking methodology we developed, clear 
differences were identified between healthcare institutions, possibly indicating that the 
presence of unwarranted variation. In 23 of the 136 healthcare institutions of which the claims 
were included in the case study, one or two DTCs produced a positive ProviderScore. These 
healthcare institutions (17%) are classified as High Risk, and qualify for further research on 
unwarranted variation. Significant differences between diagnoses are also found in terms of 
their vulnerability to unwarranted variation. Of the 23 surveyed DTCs, 10 appear to be prone 
to unwarranted variation. These 10 DTCs (43%) belong to seven different diagnoses.  
In the case of two DTCs (117s and 218s), a follow-up study has already taken place. With regards to 
DTC 117s, this study showed that the positive DTCScore was caused by administrative upcoding. 
Based on price difference and volume, the financial impact is estimated at approximately €400,000. 
The observed variation found for DTC 218s appears to be caused by the fact that some patients were 
referred to an orthopaedic surgeon for their treatment. If the logistic model is adjusted by adding the 
variable ‘whether or not the patient is treated by an orthopaedic surgeon’, most of the observed 
variation is eliminated.  
 
In case of DTC 602s in a similar situation further research has already occurred. This study showed 
that administrative upcoding was the cause of the high amount of operations. Whether 
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administrative upcoding is also causing the high amount of operation in our case is not yet clear at 
this moment. 
These results justify the conclusion that the aim of the framework - to enable healthcare insurers to 
more effectively act as a countervailing power against the effects of unwarranted variation - seems 
to be supported.  
 
A possible cause of justified variation that has not been addressed in this case study is variation 
based on general practitioners’ (GP) referral policies, when referring patients to a healthcare 
institution. It is conceivable that one GP is much more likely to refer patients to a healthcare 
institution than another, and this therefore affects the ratio of how patients are treated. In further 
research, it is important to include this variable in the framework. A similar situation can arise when 
patients are referred from one healthcare institution to another for treatment after diagnosis, if the 
first healthcare institution is not authorised to perform the treatment, for example. This variable 
should also be considered in future research. 
 
The use of a threshold value (twice the standard deviation calculated for all of the scores) is part of 
the framework. This threshold value is introduced to prevent low or negative scores from obscuring 
the outliers. The use of a threshold value based on the standard deviation, makes this value variable. 
There is a risk that possible unwarranted variation may not be detected because it scores below the 
threshold. However, the advantage of using this kind of variable threshold value is that only the 
strongest signals of unwarranted variation will be made apparent. Follow-up studies must show the 
effects of changing the threshold value. 
 
The example of DTC 218s makes it clear that, in addition to the explanatory variables which are now 
used as a standard for all DTCs, future studies should determine whether specific explanatory 
variables should be added per DTC, based on the conclusions of medically substantive assessment 
and chart reviews. By doing this, as well as adding the “GP referral policy” and “referral from another 
hospital” variables to the model, the accuracy with which the framework can identify unwarranted 
variation will increase gradually during use. 
 
In recent years, various declaration systems have been introduced in the Netherlands. All of these 
entailed their own adverse incentives, leading to either over-provision or under-provision of services. 
A framework developed with an aim to identify unwarranted variation should be able to identify 
both forms. Although our case study only examines examples of possible over-provision of service, 
the framework can also be adapted to identify under-provision or even both forms simultaneously. 
This case study is also focused on dependent variables with a dichotomous character, estimating the 
difference between the actual rate and the expected rate of treatments using logistic regression 
models. However, the use of this framework is not necessarily limited to this type of dependent 
variables. With the application of other estimators, such as linear regression, the framework can also 
be used for variables such as the cost per care pathway. It is therefore advisable to expand the 
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